General 
Von Bissin^'s 
Testament 




A Study in 
Germaii Ideals 



^ 



HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS 

NEW YORK AND LONDON 
1918 



PAMPHLETS ON THE WAR 
PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS 

THE WAR ON HOSPITAL SHIPS 

THE PIRATE'S PROGRESS. By William Archer 

GERMAN WAR AIMS. By Edwin Bevan 

BLOOD AND TREASURE 

A BRITISH CARDINAL'S VISIT TO THE 
WESTERN FRONT 

THEIR CRIMES 

GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

THE MURDER OF A NATION. By A. J. Toynbee 
With a Speech and Letter by Lord Bryce 

LINGUISTIC OPPRESSION IN THE GERMAN 
EMPIRE. By Ernest Barker 



HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK 

[ESTABUSHED 1817] 



^ 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S 
TESTAMENT 

A Study in German Ideals 




HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS 

NEW YORK AND LONDON 
I918 






GENERAL VON HISSING'S TESTAMENT; 

A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

" It is the grossest caliimny to suggest that Michaelis, 
or even the most ardent German Chauvinist thinks of 
annexing Belgium." [Leipziger Tageblatt, July 24th, 
1917.] 

"A man of the importance of Governor-General von 
Bissing, as late as January last, described his conception, 
and that of the influential circles at his side, in the well- 
known letter to Dr. Stresemanh. He says in this letter: 
'A memorandum composed for my own use by me lies 
before the House. It deals thoroughly with the future of 
Belgiimi, and without hesitation comes to this conclusion : 
If we do not win Belgiimi for Germany into our power- 
sphere, if we do not manage it and use it in German 
fashion, the war is lost.' (Interruption.) Oh, Herr Keil, 
so that is already disposed of. One must have a faith 
which can remove mountains to believe that the views 
of Herr von Bissing, who is unhappily deceased, and of 
those who shared these views, have been disposed of." 
[Speech of Hr. Haase in the Reichstag, July 19th, 1917.I 



.■?0 I 



INTRODUCTION 

SHORTLY after General von Bissing's' death, one 
of his friends, Hr. M. W. Bacmeister, a member 
of the Reichstag, pubHshed a memorandum 
signed by the ex-Governor General of Belgium. This 
document appeared at the same time in Das Grossere 
Deutschland (May 19th, 191 7) and in the Bergisch 
Mdrkische Zeitung (May i8th, 191 7). 

In order to appreciate its full importance, in the 
light of recent political and diplomatic events, a few 
words of introduction are necessary. 

The first thing which will strike the reader is the 
flagrant contradiction existing between General von 
Bissing's views concerning Belgium and the various 
declarations made implicitly or explicitly, since the 
beginning of the war, by the various representatives 
of the German Government, from the earlier speeches 
of von Bethmann Hollweg to the last utterances of the 
Kaiser. In all these declarations it has been stated 
over and over again that Germany is waging a purely 
defensive war, and that she has no intention of annexing 
Belgium: "I never indicated among our war aims," 
said the German Chancellor, speaking before the Central 
Committee of the Reichstag, "that we intended to 
annex Belgium" (November 9th, 19 16). Two months 
later, in his note to President Wilson, Herr Zimmer- 
mann, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, is 
still more emphatic. Referring to the recent declara- 

5 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

tion of the Chancellor, he writes that "the annexation 
of Belgium has never been intended by Germany." 

He adds, of course, that "Germany wants merely 
to take precautions in order that this country (Bel- 
gium), with which the Imperial Government wish 
to entertain relations of good neighborhood, could 
not be used by their enemies, in order to further aggres- 
sive military operations" (January 31st, 1917). This 
is very likely what Dr. Michaelis intends to convey, 
in his recent speech, when he talks about making 
Germany's frontiers secure, and what the Kaiser im- 
plies when he proclaims to his troops that Germany 
is fighting for her existence. But such suggestions 
remain so vague and ambiguous that the misinformed 
public remains under the impression that Belgium's 
independence is not at stake, whatever the conclusion 
of the war may be. 

How wrong such an impression is is sufficiently 
proved by the tone of von Bissing's political testa- 
ment and the various letters appended to it. 

Here is a man enjoying the Emperor's confidence, 
placed by him at the head of the administration of 
the conquered territories, who openly advocates the 
complete and unreserved annexation of Belgium to 
the Empire. It is, according to him, Germany's 
"sacred duty" to keep the territories which she has 
won at such a heavy price. King Albert must be de- 
throned, military dictatorship must reign supreme 
during long years to come, the country's independ- 
ence must never be restored, the properties of the 
exiled must be confiscated and there must be imposed 
a regime of blood and iron which will make Germany's 
rule in Alsace-Lorraine and the Polish provinces look 
foolishly weak. Such is the gist of the manifesto. 

The ex-Governor deprecates any half measures or 

6 



A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

conciliatory methods which might be contemplated in 
some moderate German quarters: Liege and Namur 
(the line of the Meuse) are not enough; Germany 
must hold Antwerp and the coast as well ; the exchange 
of Belgium against the German colonies cannot for 
one moment be contemplated; the Walloon population 
must come under German rule as well as the Flemish; 
and even to the latter, who are supposed to be more 
friendly to the Empire, complete independence can 
on no account be granted. If the Empire loses Belgium, 
whatever advantages she may obtain in other quarters, 
Germany has lost the war. 

There is no room left for a doubt: never has a more 
forcible plea for the annexation of Belgium been made 
in a more overbearing style. The ex-Governor does 
not dwell on the question of defensive war, but he grows 
very eloquent when he speaks of preparing the "next 
war." He does not, like M. Zimmermann, allude to 
the good relations which might be entertained in the 
future between the Empire and a restored Belgium; 
but he quotes with relish his master Machiavelli when 
he speaks of the necessity of getting rid of King Albert, 
even by death. 

Now, how can we explain this apparent contradic- 
tion ? How is it that the language of the faithful servant 
differs so much from that of his master? 

Several papers which are in close connection with 
the Wilhelmstrasse, feeling the difficulty of the problem, 
have tried to explain it away either by questioning 
the authorship of the Memoire, or by implying that, 
since he wrote it,* General von Bissing might have 
altered his views. Such criticisms were answered con- 
clusively by Hr. M. W. Bacmeister in the Bergisch 
Mdrkische Zeitung, by Dr. Stresemann in the Deutsche 

* The Memorandum was written towards the end of 191 5. 
7 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

Tageszeitung, and by the art critic Cornelius Gurlitt 
in the Deutsche Kurier {]nne 5th, 1917).! The private 
letters of von Bissing addressed to Cornelius Gurlitt 
and Dr. Stresemann repeat in other words the con- 
clusions of the Testament. Since the Stresemann 
letter is dated January 14th, 191 7, there is no reason 
whatever to believe that von Bissing's opinion might 
have changed before his death. As to the authorship 
of the Testament, it is enough to point out the sentence 
in which the ex-Governor alludes to this document: 
"I have at home a memorandum written by me, for 
myself, in which I study .... the question of Bel- 
gium's future." 

There is only one explanation left to us if we wish 
to clear up this mystery: While writing his political 
testament General von Bissing expresses merely his 
own ideas, and does not in the least engage the respon- 
sibility of the German Government. The memorandum 
must not be taken too seriously. It is the work of a 
dilettante indulging in a literary essay on the future 
of Belgium as a kind of relaxation to lighten the bur- 
den of his toilsome administrative work. It does not 
express faithfully the aims of the German policy pur- 
sued in Belgium. It is written in the margin of history. 

But if we are to accept this explanation, we are con- 
fronted with endless and insuperable difficulties. We 
cannot very well forget that the author, whose ideas 
were well known in Germany, had been especially 
chosen by the Kaiser to represent him, and that he 
enjoyed the special favor of his master to his last 
day. In his letter to Stresemann he declares a few weeks 
before his death that, if health is restored to him, he 
hopes "to take up again the direction of Belgian affairs 
in his Majesty's name and according to his wish." 

t See Appendix, pages 30-36, 



A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

Besides, the solemn tone of this letter seems in com- 
plete contradiction with our supposition. The ideas 
expressed in the testament are spoken of as being the 
outcome of the meditation of a dying man, and, which 
is more important still, as having inspired every act 
of his policy in Belgium during his period of administra- 
tion. 

On the other hand, how can we reconcile the idea 
that von Bissing was not in complete agreement with 
the Kaiser and his Government with the fact that his 
successor, General von Falkenhausen, has declared 
over and over again, since the publication of the memo- 
randum, that he intends to follow in his predecessor's 
footsteps ? 

Which are we, then, to believe? The German Gov- 
ernment's recent ambiguous declarations about a defen- 
sive war and a restored Belgium, or the glaring con- 
fession of the Kaiser's faithful servant about further 
annexation and the enslavement of the martyred 
country? Which are we to believe: the words of Ger- 
many, smiling innocently on benevolent neutrals and 
artless pacifists, or the acts of Germany crushing relent- 
lessly the last drop of life and hope out of the conquered 
provinces ? 

It is not for us to answer? Perhaps the reader will 
be in a better position to do so after reading the follow- 
ing pages. 

In order to draw attention to a number of the more 
striking points in von Bissing's memorandum, we have 
printed them in italics. 



GENERAL VON HISSING'S 
TESTAMENT 



IT is a curious fact that in enemy countries, in 
France and England particularly, the men at 
the helm express themselves quite freely regard- 
ing their war aims, in spite of the reverses suffered 
on the various fronts. As at the outbreak of this 
world-war, which is constantly extending its scope, 
so to-day the parcelling-out or annihilation of Ger- 
many is demanded; and this although German armies 
have made victory a matter of habit, as it were, and 
are in firm possession of huge expanses of enemy country. 

Without paying the slightest heed to the military 
situation, or hesitating at the sacrifice of treasure 
and men to which the powers allied against us vainly 
committed themselves, the anti-German press is without 
exception blinded by a strange kind of self -hypnotism. 
The extravagance of the war aims of our opponents, 
who set as little value on our own successes as on those 
already won by our allies, obviously makes it impossi- 
ble to dream of a peace in the near future which shall 
be both honorable and acceptable to Germany. 

In defence of her independence, and to assure her 
future, Germany must continue the struggle till the 
moment when she will be in a position to compel peace, 
gword in hand — a peace that will secure her ends ^n4i 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

if possible, be a lasting one. Only then will it be fitting 
to particularize our peace terms : of this many Germans, 
the Imperial Chancellor* among them, are convinced, 
though our enemies hold the opposite view. 

Ordinary prudence leads us to avoid dividing opinion 
at home in regard to these serious problems, namely: 
What guarantees must we exact from both the Eastern 
and the Western Powers? How shall we best protect 
ourselves, politically and iii a military sense? How 
shall we get what is demanded by the exigencies of 
our economic conditions? Even if our enemies — 
because they try to raise illusory hopes and to deceive 
us as to their waning strengthf and confidence — were 
to interpret as weakness our silence with regard to 
our war aims, yet, out of respect for neutrals whom 
the Entente endeavors at one time to influence and 
at another threatens, we must persist in this silence 
till we are in a position to speak categorically {bis wir 
so wirkungsvoll wie moglich auftreten konnen) . 

The statements made by the Chancellor in reply 
to questions raised by the social-democrats should 
also have quieted those people who demand that our 
war aims be made public, so that the German people 
may know why it must go on fighting and subject 
itself to fresh sacrifices. But I doubt whether it will 
ever be possible to bring conviction to circles which 
desire an immediate peace, either because they cherish 
the illusory idea of reconciliation being a matter of 
practical politics, or because they are impatient for a 
peace which, as premature, could only be a transitory 
one. In these circles, composed wholly of social-demo- 

*Von Bethmann HoUweg. 

fit is necessary to bear in mind the date of the Memorandum. 
Von Bissing came to the conclusion that the Allies' strength was waning' 
in 1915! 

12 



A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

crats, the determination of our people -to carry through 
the task to which they have set their hand is over- 
looked, while the strength of England's resistance is 
exaggerated. These folk therefore believe that Eng- 
land will never decide to make peace until we have 
evacuated Belgium and restored it to its pre-war con- 
dition — Belgium, almost the whole of which we have 
managed to conquer after fierce fighting and countless 
sacrifices. 

I will not enter into the disputed question whether 
England is invincible, and whether she possesses so 
much strength that, notwithstanding the threatening 
of the English world-Empire, and notwithstanding 
the ever-multiplying signs that England's vital nerve 
has been struck in the West and in the East, she can 
still stake everything in order to tear Belgium from 
us, in order to force us to restore Belgium to Anglo- 
French influence, and in order also to achieve the 
recovery by Belgium of her original frontiers, which 
in future will not be on the Channel but be pushed 
forward to the Eastern frontier of Belgium. I intend 
only to expand the views which I have already expressed, 
and to speak of the "dira necessitas," or rather the sacred 
duty, that we should retain Belgium for our influence 
and sphere of power, and in the interests of Germany's 
security that we should not give Belgium up. My confi- 
dent hope needs, indeed, still to be realized — that the 
final military decision shall constitute victory for us. 
But we must already be quite clear about the fact that 
a restored Belgium, whether declared a neutral coun- 
try or not, will not only be forced over naturally into 
the camp of our enemies, but will be actually drawn 
over by them. Even if one liked to cling to illusions 
about reconciliation, and even if one were able to 
create guarantees by treaties ever so good, Belgium will 

13 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

in every respect be developed and employed as a con- 
centration area and outpost position for our enemies. 

I shall now indicate the strategic importance of 
Belgium for a future war. In order to be able to con- 
duct the present war offensively at all, the German 
Supreme Command was forced to march through 
Belgium, and in this process the right wing of the 
German Army had to push itself laboriously along 
the edge of the Dutch province of Limburg. Strategi- 
cally, the objective of the present war, as regards the 
Western theatre, should con§ist in our obtaining elbow 
room, in order that in any new war whatever we should 
be able to operate with our army against France and 
England. If the result of the present war were the 
continued existence of an independent Belgian State, 
the operations would have to be conducted differently, 
and under greater difficulties, than at the beginning 
of the present war; for the aim of France and Eng- 
land will be, in conjunction with an allied or strongly 
influenced Belgium, to anticipate the German Army. 
It will, therefore, rightly be asked whether in such 
circumstances it can be possible to guarantee the free- 
dom of operations of the German right wing, and 
whether the advance of these groups of armies to con- 
duct a new war offensively is possible. 

But the present war has also shown that the posses- 
sion of the German industrial areas is a vital question 
for our ability to hold out and for an energetic con- 
duct of the war; they cannot possibly be protected 
unless we hold and defend an area in advance of the 
Rhine. In this respect the present German frontier 
is not enough. A Belgium fortified by the military 
strength of England and France is a definite menace 
to our industrial districts, whose factories are so impor- 
tant for the provision of our army. If England continues 

14 



A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

to dominate Belgium in times of peace, she will not 
shrink from the attempt to force Holland — just as she 
has now forced Greece — to abandon her neutrality, or to 
make herself serviceable for the military operations of 
England. It is, therefore, requisite to secure for all 
time, by far advanced defensive lines, the auxiliary 
resources indispensable for our conduct of war, and 
so to guarantee the freedom of operation of our right 
wing, and to widen in desirable fashion the area of our 
concentration and advance. 

Before leaving the sphere of military strategy, I 
must also refer to the fact that the Belgian industrial 
districts are of great value, not only in peace, but 
also in the event of war. A neutral Belgium, or a 
Belgium made subject to the Anglo-French influence, 
with her munitions factories, her metal industry and 
her coal, strengthens the fighting force and power of 
resistance of the country in the same way as our indus- 
trial districts do for us. It is, therefore, absolutely 
necessary to prevent Belgian industry from serving 
the armament policy of our enemies. The advantages 
which we have been able during the present war to obtain 
from Belgian industry, by the removal of machinery and 
so on, are as important as the disadvantages which our 
enemies have suffered through lack of this addition to their 
fighting strength. 

When one considers the importance of Belgium as 
the theatre of our armies' advance, and as territory 
which favors our further operations both offensively 
and defensively, there can be no further doubt that a 
frontier which is quite falsely described as the line of 
the Meuse, and is to be protected by the fortresses of 
Liege and Namur, is inadequate. No, our frontier— 
in the interest also of our sea power — must be pushed 
forward to the sea. 

15 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

The immediate importance of the Belgian industrial 
districts for our conduct of war by no means exhausts 
the subject. The war of weapons will in future be 
accompanied by a harder economic war than is the case 
to-day. Without coal what would have become of 
our policy of industrial exchange, not only with Hol- 
land, but also with far distant northern countries? 
The annual Belgian production of 23,000,000 tons of 
coal has given us a monopoly on the Continent, which has 
helped to maintain our vitality. In addition to these 
factors, which are of importance in a new war, the 
protection of our economic interests in Belgium, even 
in time of peace, is of inestimable importance. A Bel- 
gium whose independence is restored will never be 
neutral, but will submit to the protection of France 
and England. If we do not hold Belgium, administer 
Belgium in future for our interests, and protect Belgium 
by force of arms, our trade and industry will lose the 
position that they have won in Belgium, and perhaps 
will never recover them. The threat to German inter- 
ests at Antwerp is obvious, and the result will be inevit- 
able the moment Germany gives up Belgium. There 
can be no doubt that ,this country will enter into close 
economic union with England and France as soon as 
it feels itself independent once more. The Belgian 
Government and the politicians who have fled to Lon- 
don are working quite openly for this object. We shall 
of course never desire to kill Belgian industry, but by 
the imposition of special laws we must bring it under 
the same conditions of production as German industry. 
We can incorporate Belgian industry in our own indus- 
trial organizations, and so, in our own interest, make it 
a lever for the fixing of prices in the world-market. 
If we lost Antwerp we should lose not only the port 
and our influence over railway rates, etc., but above 

16 



A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

all we should lose the powerful influence which Antwerp 
possesses as a trade and money center, especially in 
South America. All these forces would naturally turn 
against is as soon as they were released. 

History has already shown how little trust could 
be placed in a neutral Belgium before the war and 
at the beginning of the war, and if, as one must, one 
appreciates the value of such historic truths, we can 
never allow ourselves to be induced to let Belgium, 
at the conclusion of peace, revive as a neutral country. 
Just as was the case before the war, a neutral Belgium, 
or an independent Belgium based upon treaties of a 
different kind, will succumb to the disastrous influence 
of England and France, and to the effort of America to 
exploit Belgian resources. Against all this our only 
weapon is the policy of power, and this policy must see 
to it that the Belgian population, now still hostile to us, 
shall adapt itself and subordinate itself, if only gradually, 
to the German domination. It is also necessary that, 
by a peace which will secure the linking up of Belgium 
with Germany, we shall be able to give the necessary 
protection to the Germans who have settled in the 
country. This protection will be of quite special im- 
portance to us for the future battle of the world-markets. 
In the same way, it is only by complete domination of 
Belgium that we can utilize for German interests the 
capital created by Belgian savings and the Belgian 
companies which already exist in large numbers in 
the countries of our enemies. We must keep under 
our control the considerable Belgian accumulations of 
capital in Turkey, the Balkans and China. 

Among the German interests in Belgium is also the 
Flemish movement, which has already made good 
progress; it would be struck an incurable blow if we 
do not extend our policy of power over Belgium. We 

17 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

have among the Flemings many open and very many 
still undeclared friends, who are ready to join the great 
circle of German world-interests. That will also be 
very important for the future policy of Holland. But 
as soon as we remove our protecting hand the Flemish 
movement will be branded by the Walloons and French- 
lings as pro- German, and will be completely suppressed. 
The Flemish question is not yet settled, and I do not 
entertain any rash hopes of seeing the Flemings lighten 
our task of governing Belgium. We must do everything 
without delay to repress boundless hopes on the part 
of the Flemings. Some of them dream of an indepen- 
dent State of Flanders, with a King to govern it, and 
of complete separation. It is true that we must protect 
the Flemish movement, hut never must we lend a hand 
to make the Flemings completely independent. The 
Flemings, with their antagonistic attitude to the Wal- 
loons, will as a Germanic tribe constitute a strengthen- 
ing of Germanism. 

Belgium must he seized and held, as it now is, and as 
it must he in future. It is only by the most simple 
possible solution of the Belgian problem that we shall 
satisfy an important condition of our future position 
in the world. If we abandon part of Belgium, or if we 
make a part of it, such as the territory of Flanders, 
into an independent Flemish State, we shall not only 
be creating considerable difficulties for ourselves, but 
we shall be depriving ourselves of the considerable 
advantages and aids which can be afforded us only 
by Belgium as a whole under German administration. 
If only on account oj the necessary hases for our fleet, and 
in order not to cut off Antwerp from the Belgian trade 
area, it is necessary, to have the adjacent hinterland. 

Thus, at the conclusion of peace, we shall find oppor- 
tunity, after a century, to repair the mistakes of the 



A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

Vienna Congress. In 187 1, by the annexation of Alsace- 
Lorraine, which Prussia even at the time of the Vienna 
Congress wanted to claim for herself, we repaired the 
first of those mistakes. It is our business now to put 
aside hesitation and ideas of reconciliation, and not 
to fall into new mistakes. Gneisenau said: 

"We must demand the cession of all territories and 
fortresses whose rivers flow into the Rhine, the Moselle, 
the Meuse, the Scheldt, and the Lys. The line Calais- 
B^le is the only frontier against France which guaran- 
tees us security against a disturbed, warlike, and capable 
people." 

Bliicher complained after the conclusion of peace in 1 8 1 5 : 

"This peace is a miserable patchwork, thanks to 
which Prussia and Germany stand betrayed before 
the whole world." 

The poet Ernst Moritz Arndt demanded the natural 
frontiers from Dunkirk to Bale. Among German 
claims he counted Flanders, Calais, Bruges, Ghent, 
Brabant, Brussels, Louvain, Antwerp and the Meuse 
districts. The lessons of a century and the events 
of the present war have proved how right was the 
judgment of Gneisenau and Blucher. 

Now we have an unique opportunity at the coming 
conclusion of peace to make good our losses, and we 
must do it because, in consequence of our own great 
development, Belgium has become still more important 
for us than ever. If we do not show ruthlessness and 
firmness, in order to wring the necessary respect for 
us from England, if we give way, if we withdraw to the 
Meuse line or make any agreement about Antwerp, 
we shall be exposed to the world as weaklings, diminish 
our great successes in the Balkans, and injure our 
prestige in Turkey and throughout Islam, in spite of 
our admirable successes in arms. 

19 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

It is only by remaining in Belgium that we shall 
force the English to recognize our equality with them. 
England must not remain master of the Belgian coast. 
She must be prevented from controlling an area which 
can be used as the starting point of a new and over- 
whelming Anglo-French offensive. Here lies the guar- 
antee for the only proper relationship with England, 
and so for a lasting peace. The same thing applies to 
France, whose policy of expansion, pursued since the 
times of Louis XIV., we have now definitely defeated. 
As soon as we go out of Belgium, I am convinced that 
not only will English and French influence be prepon- 
derant, but the military union of English and French 
troops will take place. That means in a coming war 
that more than 1,000,000 soldiers will stand ready on 
our present frontier or on the Meuse line for defence or 
for attack. 

We must keep Belgium, as France formerly tried 
to keep it against England. The importance of Belgium 
for Germany as regards Machtpolitik has been proved for 
800 years. As long as Germany was powerful she had 
Belgium mainly under her influence. For a stronger 
Germany Belgium is again a vital question, because 
Belgium as a free country constitutes, together with 
Holland, the English gate of invasion on the Continent. 
We must not in a new war again have to reckon with the 
English holding their troops in readiness for Ostend and 
Antwerp, to support the Belgian Army. 

I will only allude briefly to the grave crises in domes- 
tic politics which surrender of Belgium must produce 
in Germany. The majority of the people would not 
understand our abandonment of fruits that had long 
been in our hand — the result of our tremendous, bloody 
victory. The war will deprive us of at least 1,000,000 
men in the prime of life, and rob our industry of a great 

20 



A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

part of our best workmen. The people have a right 
to see their hopes reahzed, and so there would be deep 
dissension if they were disappointed. Moreover, our 
diplomatic failures in the last twenty years have already 
had a very bad effect among the people, and the fear 
finds ever louder expression that diplomacy will spoil 
what the sword has won. This time, after such enor- 
mous sacrifices, we cannot take the risk of such charges 
again being spread abroad. We must achieve the 
war-aim which seems to every plain man to be abso- 
lutely necessary. In Belgium we really have to do 
not merely with the smallest claims that can be justi- 
fied militarily, but with questions that are vital for 
the future of the German people and the German 
Empire. 

Anybody who, as I do, advocates with complete 
conviction and energy the retention of Belgium is 
also obliged to be quite clear about the difficulties and 
objections which may have to be overcome in order 
thoroughly to justify this energetic demand. I shall 
not discuss the views of those who dream that the 
German Government is bound by the declaration made 
at the beginning of the war, that Germany will conduct 
the war not for conquests, but only for the protection 
of the Fatherland. The conquest of Belgium has simply 
been forced upon us, and consideration of future possi- 
bilities has led to the logical conclusion that we abso- 
lutely must demand the protection of Germany by the 
extension of the German frontiers in the West. The 
objection that we must keep Germany an unadulterated 
National State, and that it would constitute a weakening 
of the national unity of Germany if we were to take 
into Germany so and so many millions of inhabitants 
of a country with a different language — such objections 
seem to me mere phrases. Germany can remain German 

21 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

and retain its German feeling, if we draw into our sphere 
of power a country which has been penetrated through 
and through by Germanic tribes — for even the Walloons 
have been made French only by time — and if, with clear 
and sure appreciation of the facts, we see to it that German 
intellect and German energy become domiciled where 
French influence has hitherto provided for the gallicization 
of the country. Germany's tasks are, of course, great 
and difficult, if Belgium submits, and is incorporated. 
But Germany is strong enough, and it is to be hoped 
that, especially after this war, she will have plenty of 
efficient men to do in Belgium, in a German sense, what 
unfortunately was not done in Alsace and Lorraine. 
Surely we shall have learnt from the mistakes that 
were made, and we shall never again have recourse to the 
vacillating policy of conciliation which was so disadvanta- 
geous not only in Alsace-Lorraine, but also in Poland. 
Of course, no people which has been appointed to play 
a creative part in the history of the world will find 
doves dropping already roasted into its mouth. A 
people which, during the war, has achieved such brilliant 
things in the trenches, in the Army Command, and in 
all branches of economic life, will have forces enough 
at its disposal to solve the difficult, but assuredly not 
insuperable, problems of peace. 

Church questions in Belgium have often been de- 
scribed as extremely serious. I admit that precisely 
the Germanic provinces of Belgium, which once de- 
fended their Protestantism so heroically, are to-day 
far more convinced adherents of the Catholic Church 
than are the easily-moved Walloons; any German 
statesman who is appointed to control the German 
administration in Belgium must realize that Catholicism 
is, and will remain, a strong and living force in Belgium, 
and that among the most important requirements for 

22 



A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

successful German work is an intelligent regard for 
the Catholic Church and its disciples. 

The problem of our influence upon the schools can 
be solved in agreement with the clergy, if obligatory 
religious teaching is introduced in the same way as 
the general obligation to attend school; there are a 
number of points of contact and agreement between 
the future German administration and the Catholic 
clergy, which must learn more and more to under- 
stand that the Catholic Church enjoys, and can 
enjoy, under the power of Germany, protection quite 
different from that which it will have if Belgium, under 
French influence, turns towards a completely Radical 
philosophy. One knows that Belgian Socialism is 
strongly influenced by French Socialism, and Vander- 
velde has often proclaimed the revolution as the com- 
pletion of the religion of freedom and equality. It is 
known that Social Democracy has become a strong 
factor for the gallicization of Belgium. The clergy, 
however, will have to associate itself with the social 
reforms which must be taken in hand immediately 
after the conclusion of peace, and in this the clergy 
will have to go hand in hand with the German adminis- 
tration. 

The question of the form in which the linking up of 
Belgium with Germany must be accomplished causes 
much racking of brains in diplomatic circles, and in 
the studies of the constitutional lawyers, and the ques- 
tion "With whom shall we conclude peace in order 
to make the right of conquest into a constitutional 
right?" has often been asked, and is certainly not easy 
to answer. Hitherto, it is true, the Royal. Government 
of Belgium and the King himself have not adhered 
to the undertakings of the Quadruple Entente not to 
enter into peace negotiations and not to conclude peace 

23 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

except jointly. But this reserve, which may soon be 
abandoned, does not open up any prospect that we 
shall ever be able to conclude with the King of the 
Belgians and his Government a peace by which Belgium 
will remain in the German sphere of power, and it is 
impossible that the Quadruple Entente, over the heads 
of its Allies, shall ever accept our peace demands with 
regard to Belgium. It only remains for us, therefore, 
to avoid during the peace negotiations all discussion about 
the form of annexation, and to apply nothing hut the 
right of conquest. It is true that dynastic considerations 
have an importance which is not to be under-estimated. 
For, in view of our just and ruthless procedure, the 
King of the Belgians will be deposed, and will remain 
abroad as an aggrieved enemy. We must put up with 
that, and it is to be regarded almost as a happy circum- 
stance that necessity compels us to leave dynastic 
considerations entirely out of account. A King will 
never voluntarily hand over his country to the con- 
queror, and Belgium's King can never consent to abandon 
his sovereignty or to allow it to be restricted. If he did so 
his prestige would be so undermined that he would 
have to be regarded not as a support, but as an obstacle, 
to German interests. On the most various occasions 
the English have described the right of conquest as the 
healthiest and simplest kind of right, and we can read in 
Machiavelli that he who desires to take possession of a 
country will be compelled to remove the King or Regent, 
even by killing him. 

These are grave decisions, but they must be taken, 
for we are concerned with the welfare and the future 
of Germany, and concerned also with the reparation for 
the war of destruction that has been directed against 
us. 

For years to come we must maintain the existing state 

24 



A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

of dictatorship. It is the only form of administration, 
based as it is upon military resources, which can be 
chosen, in order to gain time for the gradual and method- 
ical building up of the most appropriate possible ad- 
ministration. 

One must beware of wanting to determine — per- 
haps in a peace concluded in 19 16 — what can only 
be ripe for decision after decades have passed. If 
we bind ourselves too soon, it will be difficult to take 
measures to counteract those binding decisions. We 
must preserve patience and method in our procedure. 
Thence will proceed, in addition to the factors of tran- 
quillization and ever-increasing order in the machinery 
of administration, the linguistic, ecclesiastical, economic, 
judicial and military regulations, which, indeed, will 
make necessary the amendment of a number of Belgian 
laws. 

The completion of the annexation will be regarded 
by many Flemings, and by a great part of the Walloons, 
as a release from uncertainty and from vain hopes. 
Both races will be able to return to the life that will be 
rendered possible by renewed opportunity for trade 
and pleasure. During such a period of transition the 
Flemings will allow themselves to be led back from 
French tyranny to their free, although not easily con- 
trolled. Low German way of living. The Walloons 
can, and must, decide during this period whether they 
will adapt themselves to the definitely altered state of 
affairs, or whether they prefer to leave Belgium. He 
who remains in the country must declare his allegiance 
to Germany, and after a certain time must declare his 
allegiance to Germanism. In connection with this it 
cannot be tolerated that wealthy Belgians shall leave the 
country, and nevertheless draw profit from their posses- 
sions in Belgium. Expropriation is absolutely neces- 

25 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

sary, in order to prevent such a state of things as exists 
in Alsace-Lorraine to the present day. / hope that we 
shall be strong, not only with the sword, but also with 
statesmanlike illumination and preparation and all the 
things necessary to fruitful administration. Half meas- 
ures and a middle course must be condemned most of all. 
Lack of determination in the decisive days of German 
fate will be a grave wrong to the blood that has been 
shed. 

Among such half-measures I include the intention 
of treating Belgium merely as a pawn, which might 
be used to recover or extend our colonial possessions. 
As regards the extension of our colonial possessions, 
the Belgian Congo comes especially into question. 
The possession of the Belgian Congo is certainly to 
be aimed at, and I desire to insist that a German 
Colonial Empire, whatever its shape, is indispensable 
for Germany's world policy and expansion of power. 
But, on the other hand, I am of the opinion that only 
such frontiers as will contribute to the acquisition of 
greater freedom on the sea are calculated to make 
colonial possessions valuable. Consequently, the sup- 
porters of the colonial movement must also demand 
the Belgian coast, together with the Belgian hinterland. 
If we give up the Belgian coast our Fleet will lack 
important bases for its share in the protection of our 
Colonial Empire. 

I am conscious that the demand that we shall retain 
all Belgium and link it up in one form or another with 
the German sphere of power, is a great aim, which can 
be achieved only by determined and self-sacrificing courage 
and by the utmost energy and skill in negotiation. Let us 
apply a saying of Bismarck that "in policy, if in any 
sphere, faith moves mountains, and courage and victory 
are not cause and effect, but identical." 

26 



APPENDIX I 

GENERAL VON HISSING'S LETTER* 
TO DR. STRESEMANN. 

Jan. i4,t 1917- 
My dear Herr Stresemann, 

I have come herej to recover from the effects of severe 
bronchitis which attacked me about Christmas-time. I 
hope that I shall recuperate here sufficiently to be able to 
undertake once more the responsibilities imposed by the 
position which I held in Belgiiim. 

I see in the Wiesbadener Zeitung, which has just come, 
that on the 7th of January you delivered a lecture at Hanover 
on "The German Victory and a German Peace." I hope 
that you will not think me presumptuous in offering you my 
wannest congratiilations on the very correct views which 
you expressed on that occasion, and that I may be allowed 
to endorse especially what you said about the future of 
Belgium. 

For some months past no paper or patriotic gathering 
has dared to connect Belgium in any way with our war- 
aims. It looked as if, in spite of all the sacrifices Belgium 
has cost us, in spite of the victories won after so much hard 
fighting, in spite of oiir heroic stand on the Western front — 
which, after all, had no other object than to maintain our 
hold on Belgium — that country had no importance for 
Germany. It looked as if we were prepared, when the time 
for making peace should come, to restore Belg'tmi to the 

*Published in the Hamburger Nachrichten, May 30, 191 7, evening 
edition. 

jVon Bissing died on April 18, 1917. JWiesbaden. 

27 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

status she had before the war. Anyone who knows as well 
as I do how important Belgium is to Germany politically 
economically and strategically, must see how grievous a 
mistake we should make were we to conclude a peace which 
does not leave us masters of Belgium; for, whatever happens, 
Belgium cannot be allowed to remain under Franco-British 
influence but, on the contrary, must be used to enhance our 
power. Possibly the world never has seen and never will 
see again an instance of a conqueror being so greatly strength- 
ened by his conquests as we should be by winning Belgium. 

You and Herr Bassermann — who has on many occasions 
expressed very sound views on political matters — have 
recognized how important Belgium is to us, and have had 
the courage to lay stress on the fact. I personally may not 
say openly all that I think on this subject, yet I go much 
further than you do. But I am all the more grateful to you 
for having laid down so clearly, persuasively and vigorously, 
the principles underlying the reasons which compel us to 
absorb Belgium. 

There lies in my house a memorandum composed by me 
for myself alone, which deals more precisely and exhaustively 
with the future of Belgium, and the conclusion I arrive at 
is this, that, if we do not get Belgium into our sphere of power, 
and if we do not govern it in German fashion (and use it in 
German fashion) the war is lost, and do not let anyone be 
led astray by those who think superficially about the Belgian 
question, who are willing to put up with guarantees of a 
paper kind, and are content with a frontier fixed at "the 
Meuse line," which can never in any sense satisfy us as a 
frontier suited to our needs. 

We must push as far northwards as possible the frontier 
which in future will protect Belgium from England and 
France. As the coast is part of that frontier, the coast must 
be our frontier. I was delighted to see this point brought 
forward at a recent meeting of the Navy League. This will 
release us from the "wet triangle" (aus dem nasser Dreieck) 
and make it possible for us to protect our colonies when we 
have rescued them from Britain's claws. 

28 



A STUDY IN GERMAN IDEALS 

For more than two years past my policy has been guided 
by such consideration of what may happen in the future. 
Great difficulties have often been put in the way of my policy, 
and the policy of the fist alone has been set up as the right 
policy. I, however, have quietly sought to establish con- 
nexions, and although these connexions have often been 
broken, and what remains of them may only exist in secret, 
they will bear fruit as soon as Germany is able to speak the 
power-word of conquest, to recoup herself for her heavy 
sacrifices and set up guarantees without which her future 
would be endangered. 

This is how my Flemish policy has been guided and carried 
out. In the same way I have conducted my Church policy 
with a wise moderation. Perhaps it would have been easier 
for me had I adopted a Kultur-Kampf policy, but we shall 
need the Church when some day we want to develop German 
ways and German activity in Belgiiun. 

These words, which have been drawn from me only by 
your splendid lecture, are those of one who does not know 
whether his health will allow him to return to a post where 
heavy responsibility awaits him. If, as is possible, God 
gives him back his strength, you may be certain that I shall 
always be a firm supporter of those who — as you did in your 
address — are able to assess and describe the Belgian problem 
with an acute perception of what the future of Germany 
demands. 

Please excuse me for not going further into this very impor- 
tant subject. I am still ill and weak, and cannot yet write 
or even think as well as I hope to be able to do soon when 
this long holiday with which his Majesty the Emperor and 
King has been graciously pleased to honor me, has given 
me sufficient strength to administer Belgium, in his name 
and in accordance with his wishes. 

If you see Herr Basse mann kindly give him my kindest 
regards, and please accept my best wishes. 
Respectfully yours, 
(Signed) FREIHERR VON HISSING. 

General. 
29 



APPENDIX II 



LETTER OF HR. M. W. BACMEISTER.* 

"The Magdeburgische Zeitung and the Weser Zeitung, 
two papers in close touch with the Wilhelmstrasse, have 
expressed the opinion that General Freiherr von Bissing, 
the second Governor-General of Belgium, has certainly not 
acted up to the opinions expressed by him in his memoran- 
dum about Belgiimi, which appeared simultaneously in 
my review, Das Grosse Dmtschland, and in the Bergisch 
Mdrkische Zeitung. 

This is a foolish conjecture which will in no way detract 
from the importance of von Bissing's memorandtim, as I 
have it from well-informed quarters and am authorized to 
state that, to the day of his death, von Bissing remained 
faithful to those opinions as set forth in his memorandum." 

*Written to the Bergisch Mdrkische Zeitung and reproduced in the 
Deutsche Tageszeitung, May 26, 191 7, evening edition. 



APPENDIX III 

EXTRACTS FROM VON HISSING'S LETTER* TO 
HR. CORNELIUS GURLITT, THE ART CRITIC. 

"I agree with you that one cannot speak of the Belgian 
nation as such ; and I also share your opinion as to the worth- 
lessness of a referendiim, and your belief that 'the force of 
arms is the only thing able to secure peace.' Peace cannot 
be secured by agreements on paper, but only by positive and 
adequate guarantees. Even now (the letter is dated February 
17, 19 1 5) the Flemings are paying serious attention to the 
matter of how best to turn present conditions to account 
with a view to the future conso idation of Flanders. It would 
be impracticable to separate Greater Flanders from Wallonia 
(the course advised by Gurlitt). I believe with you that an 
independent Belgiimi with a predominating French element 
would in the future adopt just the same view of neutrality 
as she has he'd hitherto. I agree with you on this point: 
that in the future as heretofore we shall have to reckon with 
a coalition being made against us, and that it will be at least 
as strong a one as before. Your idea that as few foreign races 
as possible should be admitted to the German union is right 
from one point of view, but this principle is not always com- 
patible with rearrangements of the Empire's frontiers and 
fortresses." 

Further on, von Bissing pronounces against a breaking- 
up of Belgium, to avoid future complications. He maintains 

*Taken from the Deutsche Kurier, June 5, 1917. \ 
31 



GENERAL VON BISSING'S TESTAMENT 

that on the conclusion of peace, "We must make it clear 
at the outset that Belgium belongs to us by right of conquest 
and defer to a later occasion the decision as to what form self- 
government shall take. We must avoid creating a situation 
like that m Alsace-Lorraine: the annexation of Belgium must 
not prove a burden to Germany." 



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